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‘The best and most practical philosophers’: Seamen and the authority of 
experience in early modern science 
 
Abstract 
Within the historiography of early modern science, trust and credibility have become 
synonymous with genteel identity. While we should not overlook the cultural values attached to 
social hierarchy and how that shaped the credibility of knowledge claims, this has limitations 
when thinking about how contemporaries regarded the origins of that knowledge and its location 
in different types of workers and skillsets. Using the example of seamen in the circles of the Royal 
Society, this article employs the category of experience, and by extension expertise, to illustrate 
how recognized forms of knowledge and skill acted as routes to credibility and authority in early 
modern science. It argues that, within the experimental community, the seaman’s authority 
derived from their direct experience of novel and remote phenomena and the cumulative effect 
of their wider experience. The accumulated experience they acquired from frequent practice, 
observation and exposure translated into a form of ‘expertness’ that rendered seamen trustworthy 
and credible observers and thinkers. The gentlemanly trust model does not accommodate nor 
acknowledge the ways the seaman’s direct and accumulated experience (and that of many other 
professional groups) were recognized and valued in inquiry and discourse. The article therefore 
sets out a new model for understanding trust, credibility and authority in early modern science 
that can take us beyond a restrictive mono-model that locates trust in one socio-cultural category 
to highlight the multiple, and sometimes competing, claims to epistemological authority. 
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Experience, expertness, and the question of trust 
 
Thus Three parts of the World (in Error grown!)  
'Gainst Practick-knowledge vouch Opinion.  
Had brave Columbus worn so poor a Soul,  
Or bold Americus a Brain so Foul,  
Or Noble Cabot of that Temper been,  
The Indies to this Day had not been seen
1 
 
Following the European ‘discovery’ of the Americas in the late fifteenth-century, the seaman 
came to stand for the power and value of empirical learning. Firstly in the Iberian context, sailors 
and cosmographers declared experience ‘as the mother of all things’ relieving the errors and 
fictions of ancient wisdom.
2
 New knowledge was the product of new experiences and, most 
significantly, it was the actions of the ‘ignorant Columbus’ and the experience of humble seamen 
that had challenged the stock of classical knowledge. Almost two centuries onwards, the memory 
of discovery across Europe continued to emphasize the power of experience embodied in their 
example, especially within the sciences where the seaman came to represent, at least notionally, 
the empirical ideal of experimental philosophy. Robert Hooke, for instance, championed a 
vision of a new Columbian-inspired naturalist who ‘ought, as Columbus did, freely and 
impartially discover what he finds’, while Robert Boyle suggested that the ‘informations’ of 
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 John Gadbury, in Samuel Sturmy, The Mariner’s Magazine (London: 1669), n.p. 
2
 Martín Fernández de Enciso, Suma de geographia (Seville: 1519), epilogue. 
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Columbus and his ‘ordinary seamen’ were far more reliable than ‘a hundred school-
philosophers, for they were able to ‘inform men of a hundred things that they would never have 
learn’d by Aristotle’s philosophy or Ptolemy’s geography.’ Boyle championed experience as the 
true means to know and discover the natural world and, consequently, its creator, making a 
striking comparison between Christ and the apostles, those who were ‘eye witnesses and ministers 
of the things they speak of’, and the ‘navigators and travellers to America’ who had directly 
experienced the ‘state of that new world.’3 
While this was not the violent overthrow of knowledge that older accounts have suggested, 
experience became a new authoritative standard within the experimental communities of early 
modern Europe, providing a level of authority previously supplied by classical texts.
4
 This was a 
new form of experience, as Peter Dear has argued, for it was not a general statement about the 
behavior of the natural world in the Aristotelian sense, but a ‘single historical occurrence’ defined 
in time and space that could be used to support a knowledge claim. As Lorraine Daston and 
Elizabeth Lunbeck have demonstrated, observation and experiment became highly contrived 
and disciplined forms of experience, ‘both designating recourse to experience as opposed to 
rationalist systems.’5 Experience, however, had multiple and complex, meanings across early 
modern science and society. Boyle himself outlined three different forms: personal, historical, 
and theological. Personal experience was that ‘which a man acquires immediately by himself, and 
accrues to him by his own sensations’, whereas historical experience was a ‘relation, or testimony, 
whether immediately or mediately, conveyed to us’ that was formerly ‘personal in some other 
man.’ Theological experience referred to that which ‘God is pleas’d to relate to declare 
concerning himself’, being the third means of experience to understand the natural world.6 
The categorization of experience, however, can be taken even further when we consider 
experience not just as an epistemological process, but as a source of epistemological authority. 
In her linguistic analysis of the term, Anna Wierzbicka distinguished between two modes of 
experience, which I shall refer to as ‘direct experience’ and ‘accumulated experience’.7 Firstly, 
experience could denote an act of perception, a sensory moment as Boyle described above, but 
it could also refer to a collected body of experience that generated or signaled a level of 
knowledge or know-how. Singular direct experiences are founded, to varying extents, on prior 
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 Robert Hooke, ‘Of the true method of building a solid philosophy’, in Richard Waller (ed.) The Posthumous 
Works of Robert Hooke (London: 1705), pp. 20-1; Robert Boyle, The Christian Virtuoso (London: 1690), pp. 75-
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4
 For instance, see Robert Bolgar’s The Classical Heritage and its Beneficiaries (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1954) and Robert Mandrou’s From humanism to science, trans. Brian Pearce (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1978). Recent scholarship points to the overlap of textual and empirical traditions, showing that the shift from text 
to experience was not as linear as traditional accounts have suggested. For more on this, see Anthony Grafton, 
Defenders of the Text: The Traditions of Scholarship in an Age of Science 1450-1800 (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1994); New Worlds, Ancient Texts: The Power of Tradition and the Shock of Discovery 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995); Gianna Pomata and Nancy Siraisi (eds.), Historia: Empiricism and 
Erudition in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005). 
5
 Peter Dear, ‘Totius in verba: Rhetoric and authority in the early Royal Society,’ Isis 76, no. 2 (1985): 144-61, 154; 
Lorraine Daston and Elizabeth Lunbeck (eds.), Histories of Scientific Observation (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2011), p. 13. Also on experience, see Peter Dear, Discipline and experience: The mathematical way in the 
scientific revolution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995) and Richard Yeo, Notebooks, English Virtuosi, 
and Early Modern Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014), chapter 3.  
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knowledge generated through repeated practice in a particular domain. This is akin to Pamela 
Smith’s idea of embodied knowledge, the notion that certain practices are ‘digested many times 
and many times spat out.’8 Yet accumulated experience should not to be automatically aligned 
with manual workers, but to the store of experience – possessed by anyone – that could, 
eventually, amount to some form of expertise. Failure to grasp the distinctions between these 
modes of experience, and to bring them together into an integrated category of analysis, has 
resulted in a disconnect between our understanding of the authority of experience in fact-making 
and the existing historical consensus on who was considered authoritative in the world of 
experimental philosophy.  
If experience was the new authority, and that experience belonged to an individual or set of 
individuals, then the integrity of the individual was integral to assessing the integrity of the 
knowledge claim. This has been formulated into a question of trust, which for the last twenty 
years has dominated the historiographical conversation surrounding the social processes of 
knowledge-making. This has been largely the result of Steven Shapin’s influential thesis on the 
relationship between truth-telling and gentle identity, which showed how codes of gentlemanly 
behaviour, especially the disinterestedness derived from their financial independence, were 
transferred into the experimental community.
9
 Indeed, the long-standing emphasis on the 
disinterestedness of the gentleman has led to the assumption that trust was not habitually 
extended to those of non-genteel-status.  Unlike the earnest gentleman who harbored no material 
interest, these men - merchants, tradesmen, seamen and other manual workers - were considered 
a baser sort of people motivated more by the fruit, rather than the light of knowledge. In Social 
History of Truth (1994), Shapin used Boyle’s interactions with divers to highlight the issues of 
trust arising from non-gentle informants, yet Boyle’s discrediting of divers’ reports emerged from 
a whole host of issues that went beyond estimations of the diver’s greed and self-interest. Boyle’s 
skepticism often arose when testimony did not conform to accepted models of understanding, a 
result of the philosophers’ own (scholarly) self-interest, and fed into wider reservations about the 
general limits of human experience underwater where the senses were impaired by the severe 
water pressure.
10
  Most significantly, in the wider body of Boyle’s work, Boyle often sorted 
testimony according to the knowledgability and skill of those who provided it, rejecting accounts 
not because they originated from self-interested, low-ranking informants, but because they were 
made by ‘persons void of curiosity and skill to make such observations.’11 
Shapin’s work has done much to solidify the connection between gentlemen and trust in the 
historiography of early modern science, yet his work actually identified a total of seven maxims 
for determining credible testimony, which he deduced from seventeenth-century conduct 
literature. Most of these related to the nature of the testimony itself and only two of these referred 
to the actual sources of testimony: testimony from ‘sources of acknowledged integrity and 
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 Pamela H. Smith, The Body of the Artisan: Art and Experience in the Scientific Revolution (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2004), p. 114. 
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 Steven Shapin, A Social History of Truth: Civility and Science in Seventeenth-Century England (Chicago: 
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Honourable Robert Boyle, vol. 3 (London: 1772), p. 647; Shapin, The Social History of Truth, pp. 258-66 (note 
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disinterestedness’ and testimony from ‘knowledgable and skilled sources.’12 Shapin’s work 
focuses on the former, on the integrity and disinterestedness of the Restoration gentleman, 
though much remains to be said on how the knowledge and skill of informants could act as an 
alternative criteria for establishing trust and authority. Work by Barbara Shapiro and Palmira 
Fontes da Costa has already suggested that social identity was just one of many other significant 
factors alongside skill and occupation that could determine the credibility of an individual.
13
 Trust 
is ‘a system of expectation’, yet this expectation could derive from a shared belief in recognized 
forms of knowledge, skill and experience as much as it could derive from the socio-cultural 
identity of actors.
14
 While we should not overlook the cultural values attached to social hierarchy 
and how that shaped the credibility of knowledge claims, this has its limitations when thinking 
about the ways contemporaries regarded the origins of that knowledge and its location in different 
types of individuals and skillsets. If a gentleman was considered trustworthy and his relations 
credible, this did not preclude the credibility of other relators or groups, nor did it translate into 
any overarching authority.  
Expertise is a useful category to consider the ways knowledge and skill, as types of 
accumulated experience, acted as routes to authority.  It is commonly suggested that the term 
‘expertise’ did not exist in the seventeenth century, but this overlooks an equivalent word in 
seventeenth-century English: ‘expertness’.15 ‘Expertness’ was a translation of the French 
‘expertise’ and was variably defined as ‘skillfulness’ or being ‘much experienced in things.’ 
Indeed, so central was experience to ‘expertness’ that John Wilkins defined ‘inexpert’ as a 
synonym for ‘inexperience’ in his universal philosophical language.16 As an actors’ category, 
expertness then allows us to root our understanding of expertise in the seventeenth century, 
standing as testament to the empirical associations, and origin, of the concept in the early modern 
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authority in the Royal Navy, 1800-1950,’ Journal for Maritime Research 16, no. 1 (2014): 1-13; William Ashworth, 
‘Commentary: expertise and authority in the Royal Navy, 1800-1950,’ Journal for Maritime Research 16, no. 1 
(2014): 103-116. 
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the true writing, and understanding of Hard Usual English Words (London:1604); Randle Cotgrave, A Dictionary 
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period. It must, however, be pointed out that its usage was not as widespread as its sister term 
‘expert’, which had the same linguistic origins. As recent accounts of early modern expertise have 
shown, ‘expert’ was used as an adjective, not a noun, and so we are here concerned with the 
quality of being expert (or ‘much experienced’), not the figure of the ‘expert’ per se. This is an 
important distinction if we are to avoid investing modern meaning into the term, for the question 
of who counted as ‘expert’ in the seventeenth century was not settled. As Eric Ash articulates, ‘to 
be expert was to possess and control a body of specialised practical or productive knowledge, not 
readily available to everyone’, though this did not mean that expertise in a particular subject came 
in one form, or that it was located in one place.
 17
 Indeed, it may be productive to start thinking 
about expertise as different types of accumulated experience competing for legitimacy and 
authority. Through recognizing this and the explicit semantic connection between expertness and 
experience, we can begin to determine the authority attached to different forms of experiential 
knowledge, uniting the social identity of practitioners with the origins of the knowledge they 
espoused.  
Given the unique make-up of expertness in different professional groups, or indeed 
individuals, we need to turn to specialized case studies to ascertain how certain skillsets were 
valued and assessed. Seamen offer an interesting case study to consider how the direct and 
accumulated experience of sources could translate into estimations of trust and authority. Firstly, 
the maritime sphere was an important culture of knowledge where information and skills were 
imparted, exchanged, and circulated on a global scale and, as a result, maritime culture has 
started to occupy an important place in the vibrant scholarship surrounding the participation of 
low-status manual workers in scientific inquiry.
18
 However, efforts to place seamen amongst this 
diverse cast of characters, encompassing technicians, slaves, craftsmen and artists, highlight the 
complexity of this field. The work of Pamela Smith and Pamela Long, for instance, has made a 
substantial contribution to our understanding of these workers and their empirical ways of 
working with nature and its materials.
19
 From goldsmiths to glassmakers, painters to sculptors, 
they focus on artisans who worked in a creative or artistic capacity, yet even within this wide-
ranging typology, the emphasis on makers has left a smaller space to consider other manual 
workers, like seamen, who do not fit the conventional artisan mold. Blowing a vase or assembling 
a clock mechanism was different from navigating a ship or putting up the rigging.  
Seamen were not artisans who ‘work[ed] with their hands in craft production’; they steered, 
rigged, built, cleaned, maintained, observed, planned, calculated, managed, and directed. Like 
most workers, their activity cannot be simply explained via the episteme/techne divide, for their 
work was a complex zig-zag between different forms of knowledge and skills, which were located 
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 Eric H. Ash, ‘Introduction: Expertise and the Early Modern State’, in ‘Expertise: Practical Knowledge and the 
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in different types of maritime practitioner. One way of actually moving past this dichotomy is by 
returning to the Aristotelian division of knowledge and visualizing the relationship between 
different forms of activity. From the primary categories of theoria (theory), poesis (production), 
and praxis (action) come the virtues of episteme (knowledge), techne (craft/art), and phronesis 
(practical wisdom), respectively.20 The distinction between theoria/episteme, on the one hand, 
and poesis/techne, on the other, is well observed in the historiography of science, having been 
(problematically) distilled into the basic opposition of theory and practice, yet this important third 
element - praxis/phronesis - has been significantly overlooked. What is interesting here is the 
distinction between poesis and praxis, for in the Aristotelian tradition techne was aligned 
specifically with poeis (production), not praxis (action). In a sense, phronesis operated between 
episteme and techne, for it involved both thinking and doing (it was wisdom gained from 
experience). This helps collapse the boundary between thought and action, and head and hand, 
and can potentially open up the historiographical categories surrounding the different sorts of 
workers, and their associated modes of experience and expertise, involved in the development 
of the sciences. The distinction between poesis and praxis, those with the goal of production and 
those with the goal of action, is therefore useful in opening up the category of the 
artisan/practitioner to consider skilled labourers, such as miners, husbandmen and indeed 
seamen, who operated outside the workshop. 
The term ‘seamen’ itself is a capacious category that obscures the multiple roles aboard a ship 
and I am here defining them as seafarers from across the socio-economic spectrum. Many 
commissioned posts in the navy still belonged to gentlemen, but what is interesting here is that 
this was rarely emphasized by experimenters, suggesting that the maritime informants they 
encountered were either of non-genteel status, or that this was simply immaterial to the 
establishment of the seaman’s authority. In fact, the question of civility versus experience finds 
an interesting parallel in the naval sphere as we see it reflected in the long-standing debate 
between the commission of gentlemen and tarpaulin officers.
21
 For reasons of honor, military 
prowess, and the need to maintain the loyalty of the gentry, the commission of gentlemen was 
often favored over tarpaulins, who were typically of lower social origin, but who had greater 
seafaring experience and were the mainstay of mercantile shipping. Yet a number of naval 
administrative reforms in the late-seventeenth century signaled the increasing importance 
attached to the value of experience in senior postings: the 1661 ‘volunteer per order’ system, for 
instance, sought to transform gentlemen into tarpaulins by giving them a practical foundation in 
the nautical arts, and, in 1677, a minimum sea-service requirement and a practical examination 
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for entering lieutenants were introduced.
22
 What we see in the naval context is almost an inversion 
of Shapin’s argument about the importance of gentlemanly virtue, for many in the administration, 
especially Samuel Pepys who operated at the intersection of learned and naval circles, questioned 
the gentleman’s emphasis on honour and etiquette and thus their fitness to command at sea on 
the basis of civility alone. 
In this article, I intend to elaborate on ‘experience’, both direct and accumulated, as another 
important criteria for establishing trust and credibility in early modern science, one that is more 
inclusive of the multiple claims to epistemological authority than the gentlemanly trust model. 
This article argues that, within the experimental community, the seaman’s authority derived from 
their direct experience of novel and remote phenomena and the long-term accumulation of that 
experience, which amounted to a form of ‘expertness’. It therefore highlights the significance 
attached to different modes of experience and how this facilitated participation in the processes 
of knowledge-making. The emphasis on expertness still meant that the system of knowledge 
production remained hierarchical, but this operated on the basis of skill rather than status. 
Through experimenting, observing, and witnessing natural phenomena, experience was the chief 
means by which experimental philosophers established matters of fact, but it was also the route 
by which highly skilled, non-genteel individuals could participate in that community. Experience 
was the key facilitator, expanding both the epistemological and social parameters of early modern 
science. 
 
Seamen and the geography of personal experience  
 
In the preface to A New Voyage round the world, the infamous buccaneer William Dampier 
justified his relation of foreign lands, and its dedication to the Royal Society, by emphasizing the 
novelty of his experience: ‘as the scene of them is not only remote, but for the most part little 
frequented also, so there may be some things in them New even to you.’23 ‘One who rambles 
about a Country,’ he continued ‘can give usually a better account of it, than a Carrier who jogs 
on to his Inn, without ever going out of his Road.’ The peculiarity of Dampier’s experience and 
the ways in which it was geographically defined became the foundation of his authority. Some 
scholars have highlighted the ‘narrative of reformation’ in Dampier’s texts, where his piratical 
past is softened for a learned, polite audience, but even the suspected editorial interventions of 
Hans Sloane point to the overriding significance of Dampier’s direct contact with the phenomena 
he reported on.
24
 Indeed, in a review of New Voyage in the Philosophical Transactions, it was 
remarked that Dampier’s ‘opportunity of visiting many ports and places, scarcely described in 
any voyages’ had made him ‘more diligent in his observations, and more particular in his 
descriptions.’25 As Philip Edwards has shown, the revisions to Dampier’s original text mostly 
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25
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related to expansion of geographical or ethnographic description that could have only derived 
from eye witness material.
26
 
Seamen like Dampier had become the eyes for a whole experimental community, bringing 
alive foreign places that were scarcely frequented by the metropolitan experimental philosopher. 
Robert Knox, the East India Company merchant who penned Historical Relation of Ceylon, was 
lauded by Hooke for transporting ‘a whole kingdom…in his head’, while Basil Ringrose’s 
Bucaniers of America, which mixed adventure with natural history, was similarly distinguished 
due to its relators ‘having been not only eye-witnesses, but also actors in the transactions they 
report’, again emphasizing ‘the novelty of their exploits.’27  The necessity for geographically 
dispersed witnesses manifested itself in the various forms of travel instruction issued by the Royal 
Society in its early years. The chief of these was the ‘Directions for Seamen bound for far 
voyages’, which drew on the quotidian experience of English seamen, who were requested to 
record tides, winds, storms; draught, plot and sound coastlines; and observe the declination of 
the compass. Now the fact that seamen were specifically sought to conduct these inquiries is only 
surprising if we continue to equate trust and credibility with gentlemanly virtue and ignore the 
authority of experience in the experimental community. Given the emphasis on witnessing in the 
circles of experimental knowledge-making, seamen were, in many ways, the obvious choice of 
informant.28 They had frequent opportunity to observe maritime phenomena, expanding 
geographies of experience and increasing the Royal Society’s ‘philosophical stock by the 
advantage, which England enjoys of making voyages into all parts of the world.’29  
As with other forms of travel instruction, the ‘Directions’ disciplined the experience of the 
observer by ‘calling for only simple, perceptible facts’.30 If geographies of experience were to 
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expand, if the collection of data on a global scale was to eventually bring forth new doctrines and 
principles, then the direct experience of various observers needed to be made commensurate. 
Instructions trained the eyes how to see and forms and instruments provided ‘templates for 
standardization’, distilling experience into numbers and matters of fact that could be compared, 
contrasted, and collated.
31
 Boyle had more generally argued that inquiries should include 
‘proposals of ways to enable men to give answers to these more difficult inquiries’ and the 
‘Directions’ themselves illustrate this kind of enabling process, which worked to facilitate 
participation in information-gathering initiatives.
32
 The ‘Directions’ should then be understood 
as a form of didactic literature that aimed ‘to better capacitate [seamen] for making such 
observations.’33 They sought to draw on and perfect seamen’s skills, mobilising their potential as 
observers and disciplining their experience for philosophical ends. In the second, expanded 
edition of the ‘Directions’, seamen were not only told what to observe, but how to observe it: 
they were told to observe weather and tidal changes, but they were also instructed how to mark 
and register these changes carefully; they were told to measure the depth of the sea with new 
sounding devices, but they were also instructed how to assemble and operate these instruments, 
being invited to visit Gresham College to acquire these instruments and be instructed in the use 
of them.  
Seamen, like any set of informants, were credible in number and the emphasis on 
corroboration required the repetition of observations and experiments at different times and 
places. It was widely held that a higher number of corroborating accounts translated into a higher 
degree of certainty, an idea that was demonstrated mathematically in an anonymous article on 
the ‘Calculation of the credibility of Human Testimony’ in Edmond Halley’s Miscellanea 
Curiosa.
34
 It was the opinion of the Royal Society secretary, Henry Oldenburg, that in the 
distribution of inquiries ‘’tis altogether necessary, to have confirmations of the truth of these 
things from several hands, before they be relied on.’35 This sentiment was shared by many, 
including Halley, who argued that investigation into the trade winds was ‘not the work of one, 
nor of few, but of a multitude of Observers to bring together the experience requisite to compose 
a perfect and complete History.’36 This was the sort of history that the ‘Directions’ intended to 
make possible. Asked to observe the declination and variation of the compass, seamen were 
instructed to do so ‘in as many places as they can, and in the same places, every single voyage.’ 
Observations of the tides were required ‘in as many places as may be’; precise times of the ‘flood 
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and ebb’ were to be recorded in all rivers, bays, capes and harbours and notes to be made on 
the nature of tides at different times of the year. The situation of dangerous rocks, channels, and 
passages were to be recorded ‘in all places’ and a register was to be kept ‘of all changes of wind 
and weather at all hours by night and by day.’ It was expected that these observations and 
experiments were to be repeated on every new voyage and so ‘from [these] multitudes of 
Experiments and Observations, such rules may be framed, as may be of inestimable use.’37 The 
‘Directions’ recommended that each experiment was to be repeated every new voyage, ‘the 
multitude and frequency of them being necessary for finding out and confirming the truth of 
them.’38  
In one sense, the ‘Directions’ could be interpreted as a necessary, even regrettable, 
arrangement in circumstances where experimental philosophers were unable to observe 
phenomena themselves. Yet, to some degree, this was to be expected in an empirical culture that 
privileged one’s own personal experience over the secondary accounts of others (any others). As 
Boyle explained, ‘I must either make use of other men’s testimonies or leave some of the 
remarkablest phenomena…unmentioned’.39 Furthermore, the term ‘Directions’ suggests 
something more facilitative than conventional forms of travel instruction. Most other instructions 
issued by the Royal Society were labeled as ‘inquiries’, not ‘directions’, and Oldenburg 
distinguished between the two as distinct forms. As their names implied, ‘inquiries’ often 
consisted of a diverse set of specific questions limited only by geographic boundaries – ‘of things 
observable in foreign countries’ - usually with the aim to confirm or reject existing accounts. This 
was a similar mode of fact-checking to Thomas Browne’s Pseudodoxia Epidemica (1646), which 
pursued ‘enquiries into very many received tenets and commonly presumed truths’ to eliminate 
erroneous thinking about the natural world. The ‘Directions’, on the other hand, were something 
rather different; they were not questions, but directives to collect raw data on different natural 
phenomena, ‘on the particulars they desire chiefly to be informed about.’  This involved making, 
rather than checking facts, requiring precise measurement, efficient and accurate recording, and 
the skillful handling and construction of new instruments. This made the programme set out in 
the ‘Directions’ arguably more central to the experimental process – of making new facts and 
generating new rules – than the enquiries distributed to other types of traveler. 
The direct experience of seamen acted as a source of their authority to speak on foreign and 
strange natural phenomena, an experiential privilege they had acquired through travel.  However, 
experience, as an analytical category, enters a different guise when we consider the ways in which 
direct experiences were accumulated and how this converted into recognized forms of skill or 
expertness. Seamen were more than necessary extensions of the senses in extreme cases of data 
collection. The targeting of seamen in the search for maritime particulars meant that specialist 
knowledge was desirable in the observer.
40
 Seamen were targeted because their experience 
entailed something more than direct contact with nature; it was their accumulated experience of 
the maritime environment, their expertness, that rendered them ideal observers of this sort of 
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phenomena. This is a situation that can also be seen in the recruitment of tidal observers in the 
Philosophical Transactions, where the initial advertisement for ‘understanding persons’ of a non-
descript background turned into a preference for those with greater experience of the seas and 
coastlines. Like the ‘Directions’, Robert Moray’s tidal inquiries developed the epistemic tools for 
recording and standardizing measurements, including a ‘pattern’ or template for a tide table to 
record tidal observations.
41
 Moray corroborated his own observations, recorded off the west coast 
of Scotland, with the experience of local residents whose status as ‘islanders’ indicated a certain 
expertness in maritime knowledge: 
 
The Gentleman, to whom the island belongs at present, and divers of his brothers and 
friends, knowing and discreet persons, and expert in all such parts of sea-matters, as other 
islanders commonly are.
42
 
 
When it came to establishing the credibility of his informants, Moray placed greater emphasis 
on the islanders’ expertness (a result of their frequent exposure to the seas) than the character of 
the gentleman. Similarly, John Wallis, when developing his theory of the tides, relied on the 
observations of the residents of Romney Marsh, who frequently experienced the effects of the 
tides. In fact, Wallis actually attributed the veracity of the inhabitant’s relations to their self-
interest; their livelihood depended on grazing or feeding sheep and so they were consequently 
‘very vigilant and observant, at what times they are most in danger of having their lands 
drowned.’43 Wallis also promoted the use of water-men to observe the tides, but it was the 
testimony and experience of the seaman that he privileged over all observers by means of their 
expertness on coastal and open waters;  ‘the judgement of seamen [being] more considerable 
than that of the [regular] inhabitants.’44 
The ‘Directions’ appear to follow Boyle’s general prescription that inquiries should be devised 
which ‘require learning or skill in the answerer.’45 Instead of addressing the generic seaman (or 
indeed any other traveler), the second, expanded edition of the ‘Directions’ explicitly targeted 
the masters and pilots of ships, those who were responsible for navigation and who could be said 
to possess specialist skills. In his lectures on navigation, Hooke also made an important 
distinction between masters and pilots, on the one hand, and the mariner and steersman, on the 
other. He declared that he would not meddle with the ‘mechanical part’ of the mariner, the actual 
practice of moving and guiding the ship, but concerned himself with the ‘theoretical part which 
is proper to the pilot and master, who directs the steers man what course to take.’46 The specific 
appeal to masters and pilots over the higher commissioned naval offices of lieutenant and captain 
indicates the epistemic value of experience and skill over rank and status. This was further 
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emphasized by the fact that officials at Trinity House (England’s piloting body), not the Royal 
Society, were to distribute the ‘Directions’ to ‘as many ingenious persons, as have opportunity’ 
and, in particular, determine which seamen were considered ‘fit for performance.’47 The selection 
of seamen was rooted in maritime standards of good seamanship. The ‘Directions’ were not 
designed to be distributed to those who had the simple opportunity to observe, but to those with 
the skills to do so.  
On the institutional level of the Royal Society, the ‘Directions’ delineate the central role of 
seamen in expanding geographies of experience and the ways their credibility and authority as 
informants were rooted in direct experience of the unfamiliar and the accumulated experience, 
or expertness, that this and their wider experience generated. Yet, whilst not undermining the 
significance attached to seamen in the ‘Directions’, we should approach them with caution when 
considering their wider distribution and use. Some historians and literary scholars have 
celebrated the ‘Directions’ as an epistemic tool that ‘mold[ed] the sea journal into a product that 
would increasingly meet the Royal Society’s requirements.’48 However, the standardization of log 
books in the late-seventeenth and early-eighteenth century was less a result of the ‘Directions’, 
than part of a simultaneous development within the naval administration for more useful, 
accurate information as logbooks gradually became more systematized across early modern 
Europe. By the 1660s, the admiralty was already requesting that captains keep ‘a true and exact 
journal of their proceedings’, while chartered companies, such as the East India Company had 
required ‘a journal of each days navigation’ from the beginning of the century.49 Furthermore the 
absence of any references to observational ‘diaries’ received as part of the initiative, as well as 
Hooke’s continued comments on the need for seamen’s observations to be ‘retained and 
preserved’ suggests that the ‘Directions’ serve as a statement of the institution’s vision for the 
participation of seamen in information-gathering, rather than plain evidence of their 
involvement.
50
 The ‘Directions’ were almost predicated on a notion of a boundless, omnipresent 
seaman who, unshackled by his occupational duties and the physical demands of seafaring, could 
collect, record and measure at every opportunity across time and space. Aside from these 
practical challenges, Hooke also identified the problem as a lack of ‘public encouragement’ to 
enforce compliance with the ‘Directions’ and ensure the preservation of useful travel accounts. 
He argued that the Royal Society had delivered in ‘preparing and dispersing instructions to this 
end’, but this could only prove productive ‘if the Publick would allow a Recompence to the 
Undertakers’, who were in need of some ‘moderate encouragement and reward.’51 This was far 
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apart from the financially disinterested gentleman philosopher that Shapin has spoken of. To 
Hooke, and to Wallis, financial incentive or occupational interest did not compromise the 
faithful recording of observations or the credibility of informants. To the contrary, it strengthened 
it. Hooke stood as a powerful counter-example to this himself as salaried member of the Royal 
Society, while René Descartes in his Discourse on Method also suggested that the payment of 
artisans to conduct experiments and observations might actually ensure accuracy given the power 
of their pecuniary interest.
52
 
 
Accumulated experience and the expert mariner 
 
Experience, as we have seen, was fundamental to notions of expert. It was entwined with 
estimations of a person’s knowledge and skill that had developed through continued exposure 
and practice. The image of a skilled, competent seaman, however, competed with a pejorative 
stereotype of him as ill-educated, ill-equipped, and ill-mannered.’53 Many gentleman 
philosophers subscribed to the stereotype of the unruly, ignorant seaman, framing some of their 
maritime inquiries as a response to what they saw as the ‘erroneous and idle’ state of the seaman’s 
knowledge. Yet there was clear distinction made between the ignorant seaman and a superior 
caste of seaman - the masters and pilots of the ‘Directions - who were more knowledgeable and 
more expert than the common multitude. This binary is clearly reflected in the writings of John 
Flamsteed, the first Astronomer Royal, who distinguished those seamen who ‘had needless fears 
of breaking their backs with the burdens of unnecessary knowledge’ from those ‘very ingenious 
persons among them, capable of the depth of knowledge.’54 There still existed a hierarchy of 
seamen within the experimental community, but this corresponded to the skill and experience 
of the seaman, rather than his status, civility or perceived disinterestedness. In his navigational 
treatise The Mariner’s Magazine (1669), Samuel Sturmy similarly contended that navigation was 
‘daily practiced by expert seamen: but much abused by hundreds of ignorant asses.’ Sturmy, like 
many others, pitted the expert against the ignorant, seeing the ‘expert seaman’ as a product of 
the union of ‘theorick’ and ‘practick.’55  
Sturmy himself was an example of the ‘expert’ seamen, who received recognition for the value 
of his direct and accumulated experience, a web of skill and prior knowledge that informed 
singular, empirical observations. He may have been the master of a merchant vessel, but he had 
a rather modest background. The son of a grocer, apprenticed to a sail maker, he was, as most 
merchant captains, a tarpaulin, not a gentleman, and his rank as master was a sign that he was an 
experienced seaman, but a seaman nonetheless.
56
 In a letter of introduction to Oldenburg, John 
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Beale introduced Sturmy’s work on magnetic variation and the tides, which were natural 
phenomena that Sturmy, as a seaman, had the opportunity to observe first-hand. Beale recorded 
the circumstantial detail surrounding Sturmy’s observations (where it was observed and in whose 
presence), harnessing and disciplining Sturmy’s experience to make it epistemically serviceable. 
This was typical of observational reporting, for it facilitated a form of ‘virtual witnessing’ by 
recreating personal experiences through literary form.
57
 This added credence to Sturmy’s 
observations, but his overall credibility was compounded by his perceived ‘expertness’ in 
maritime affairs. Central to Beale’s presentation of Sturmy was the fact that he ‘hath beene used 
to ye sea from his childhood, and was many yeares a commander of a merchant ship.’ When 
Sturmy’s observations were published, he was described as an ‘experienced seaman’, which 
signaled a level of know-how on the subject that others were unlikely to possess.
58
  
Expert seamen like Sturmy became an essential part of the Royal Society’s intelligence 
networks. Following Beale’s introduction, Oldenburg published Sturmy’s tidal observations in 
the Philosophical Transactions and his data was also used to calculate the precession of the 
equinoxes in the third book of Newton’s Principia Mathematica, forming – as Simon Schaffer 
has shown - a key part of the global information order that underpinned Newton’s work.59 
However, despite the best efforts of its propagandists, we should be careful that this not give way 
to an impression of the Royal Society as an egalitarian institution ‘settled of many eminent men 
of all Qualities.’60 Here we must distinguish the Royal Society as a social institution from the 
general investigative activities that it initiated or promoted. What is perhaps most interesting 
about Beale’s letter is that, following his positive endorsement of Sturmy, he moves to separate 
him from the fellowship:  ‘I shall give you caution,’ he wrote, ‘I do not recommend Captain 
Sturmy, as worthy to be of the Royal Society, but as worthy to have some good countenance & 
encouragement for his industry & heartiness.’61 There was a high prestige attached to the 
fellowship, and fellows were often admitted for the status they carried and, as a result, also 
conferred on the Society. Yet the social make-up of the fellowship was not indicative of the range 
of individuals involved in its associated modes of inquiry. Beale appears to observe this 
distinction when he recommends that, while Sturmy was not worthy ‘to be of the Royal Society’, 
he was worthy to receive some ‘countenance and encouragement’ from them. Certain codes of 
civility may have animated the social life of experimental philosophy, but that does not mean 
they dictated epistemic practice. Dampier and Knox, for instance, may have been invited to 
participate in the formalities of the Royal Society at meetings and dinners, but it was ultimately 
their experience that had enabled them to report and discourse on the natural world. 
Boyle’s body of work offers the most abundant examples of the variety of seamen involved in 
the supply of maritime information, showing how he fashioned the seaman’s credibility on the 
basis of their accumulated experience of the maritime world. He used the testimony of seamen 
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in three particular forms: direct, oral testimony; second-hand testimony; and written testimony. 
Within Boyle’s classification system, these were all forms of historical experience, relations or 
testimonies that had been personal in another man.
62
 Writing in ‘Relations about the bottom of 
the sea’, he criticized naturalists who relied on ‘hearsay’ and proudly recited what he had learned 
from ‘many navigators and travelers I have had opportunity to converse with’, especially those 
who ‘were the likeliest to give me good information about these matters.’63 To Boyle, the ‘likeliest’ 
were those seamen with notable skill and experience: an ‘ancient and expert seaman’, ‘an ancient 
navigator who passes for the most experienced pilot in our nation for a east India voyage’, ‘a sea 
captain of extraordinary skill’, ‘an ancient sea-commander that had many years frequented Africa 
and India.’ Here, a seaman’s designation as ‘ancient’ signaled his level of experience, and was 
considered a reasonable indicator of his knowledge and trustworthiness. It was ‘reputation’ that 
made Boyle ‘endeavor to have a little conference with [men] about the subject.’64  
To Boyle, it was the accumulated experience of maritime observers that indicated their 
credibility, not their rank or status per se. Although the seamen employed by Boyle tended to be 
of a higher rank, this served to reinforce their expertness, rather than their credibility alone. In 
fact, in one particular instance where a sea captain was of high birth, Boyle presented him not as 
a seaman, but as a gentleman; ‘having the honour to discourse with a nobleperson who has divers 
times deservedly had the command of English fleets.’65 We could then reasonably suppose that 
other pilots, navigators and captains that Boyle encountered were often of modest backgrounds 
unless stated otherwise: nobleman or nobleperson being the appropriate term for a gentleman 
captain. In ‘New Experiments and observations touching the Cold’, Boyle made heavy use of the 
observations of Captain Thomas James, stressing that ‘by [James’] breeding in the university, and 
his acquaintance with the mathematics, he was enabled to make far better use [of the opportunity 
to observe] than an ordinary seamen would have done.’66 James’ breeding in the university was 
not used as social signifier, but as an indicator of his wider knowledge and skill, for competence 
in mathematics was regarded, as we shall see, as a key requisite for the expert seaman. There was 
a general preference for reporters who were both curious to explore the natural world and, like 
Captain James, knowledgeable enough to report on it. Boyle emphasized these qualities in his 
own informants, writing of a ‘famously inquisitive navigator’, ‘some navigators of the most 
conversant in the [subject of the] cold’ ‘a navigator very curious of celestial observations’ and ‘a 
great commander at sea, who has both an extraordinary curiosity, and an unusual care in making 
observations.’67  
By integrating seamen’s testimony into his own writing, Boyle vouched for their credibility, 
which he located in estimations of the seaman’s expertness. There was a degree of selectivity to 
Boyle’s use of the testimony of others, but this was often based on how far testimony could be 
explained via contemporary mechanical or scientific principles over any other factor. In some 
cases, Boyle was mindful of the potential skepticism of his readers, pre-empting their incredulity 
by addressing the apparent ‘strangeness’ of relations, while simultaneously seeking to reaffirm 
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their credibility. In ‘The Experimental History of the Cold’, he did this in two ways: firstly, by 
multiplying seamen’s testimony ‘to keep them by their mutual support, from being entertain’d 
with a disbelief’ and secondly, by reconciling their testimony with his own theoretical framework. 
‘As for the other newly mention'd relations of Seamen and Travellers’, Boyle wrote: 
 
though to us, that live in England, they cannot but seem very strange; yet I am kept from 
rejecting them as utterly incredible, by considering, that ice and snow having before their 
Congelation been water, must in probability owe their Coldness, to that which reign’d in the 
Air.
68
 
 
Even within the margins of the ‘strange’, Boyle demonstrated a readiness to accept and 
appropriate seamen’s testimony, especially when they could be accommodated by existing 
modes of thinking. The ‘writings or verbal Relations of Navigators and Travellers’ became a 
significant component of his investigative methodology, which he would ‘subjoin’ with 
information he had gathered from his own experiments.
69
 
Seamen provided supplementary experience to the experimental philosopher’s; their 
experience could confirm existing ideas, fill the gaps, and enlarge the pool of natural knowledge. 
Even those philosophers with more direct experience of the seas than Boyle reserved a space for 
the testimony of seamen, pointing to the value of their experience even alongside parallel claims 
to maritime expertise. Halley, for instance, who voyaged to St Helena in the 1670s and into the 
South Seas in the late 1690s, made great use of accounts ‘by our seamen’, specifically the 
‘accounts of East-India and Guinea Navigators.’ In fact, he argued that their testimony was 
necessary ‘so that what I have here Collected may be either confirm’d or amended, or by the 
addition of some material circumstances enlarge’d.’ On subjects such as the trade winds, Halley 
felt able to challenge and rectify existing accounts, as well as his own, by virtue of the 
conversations he had with numerous navigators.
70
 As the ‘Directions’ illustrated, any ‘complete 
and perfect’ theory required high numbers of observations in order for information to be 
compared, collated, and consolidated and for conclusions to extend from the local to the global.  
However, seamen did more than collect raw data, their interpretation and judgement were 
valued too. In Voyage to Jamaica (1707), we see Sloane repeatedly seek further information from 
seamen on marine birds, animals, and fish. Seamen developed their own nomenclature for the 
species they encountered at sea, which was often shaped by their own experience: the ‘man of 
war bird’ in the West Indies, for instance, was said to foretell the coming of a ship, while the 
‘caravel’ jellyfish was so-called for it resembled the sails of the Portuguese man-of-war. Sloane 
variably adopted these terms in Voyage to Jamaica, or replaced them with a more formal, 
Latinised nomenclature of his own.
71
 Like Boyle, he interweaved seamen’s experiences and 
descriptions with his own and with many other printed accounts. After citing the work of Richard 
Hakluyt and Jean de Léry (maritime explorers not naturalists) on the ‘caravel’ jellyfish, for 
example, Sloane described his own experience of the creature, proceeding to explain that the 
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‘seamen do affirm that [jellyfish] have great skill in sailing, managing their bladder or sail with 
judgement, as may be most for their purpose, according to their different winds and courses.’72 
The seamen’s descriptions were useful and authoritative, providing the necessary supplementary 
information to corroborate and expand existing knowledge.  
Sloane had direct access to the opinions of seamen throughout his voyage to Jamaica and his 
account provides a snapshot into the working relationships between himself and the crew.
73
 He 
documented a particularly interesting encounter whereby a seaman from the upper deck brought 
him a large grasshopper, which had fallen from the rigging of the ship. The seaman was clearly 
aware of Sloane’s interest in natural history and was sufficiently engaged with the subject to 
consider the incident ‘strange’ and worthy of the naturalist’s attention. This individual act by the 
seaman, delivering the grasshopper to Sloane, set in motion a line of inquiry that can be traced 
in Sloane’s account of the exchange in the Voyage to Jamaica. Sloane inquired into the 
appearance of the grasshopper ‘a very great way from land’, hearing from the rest of the crew 
that they had also seen these insects fly through the rigging and, once ashore, from Rear Admiral 
John Narborough, ‘a very experience’d and observing person’, who had also observed the same. 
He proceeded to describe the anatomy of the grasshopper in great detail and cross-referenced 
this occurrence with other printed accounts, such as Purchas and the Dutch admiral, Steven van 
der Hagen.
74
 Sloane was open to seamen’s notions and judgements, attempting to fit their 
knowledge into contemporary configurations of the natural world. This is particularly clear in his 
treatment of explanations for the ‘sparking light of seawater’, which continually perplexed him. 
The seamen had reported to Sloane that this phenomenon was most commonly observed in 
‘southerly winds than any other’; ‘how true I know not,’ he replied, ‘but am sure the more the 
sea is broken or white, the more you see of them.’ Sloane posited that the ‘sparking’ proceeded 
from ‘the small corrupted parts of fish’ floating near the surface of the water, but he sought to 
reconcile these thoughts with the ideas of the seamen, commenting that ‘the relation of seamen 
may well enough agree with this, the south winds being warmer and more promoting of 
putrefaction.’ Sloane chose not to reject the seamen’s theory on the incidence of ‘sparkling’ in 
southern winds, instead using them to reinforce his own conclusions on putrefaction, for 
reconciliation added credence to both sets of ideas. If Sloane’s ideas were considered 
‘unreasonable’, he offered his readers ‘the relations of several seamen’ who could assent to the 
accuracy of his own assertions; seamen having ‘sailed a great many hours through Fishes spawn; 
I myself have so for more than two days.’75 In this instance, the relationship was almost symbiotic, 
for while Sloane vouched for the integrity of the seamen’s testimony, the breadth of their 
experience reinforced Sloane’s own notions too. 
Boyle, Halley, and Sloane’s work shows clear recognition of the seaman’s expertness and their 
authority to speak on the natural world. This cannot be said to reflect on all seamen, of course; 
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as with the Directions, those consulted were often noted for their skill and knowledge, for being 
particularly expert (though in the absence of distinguished expertise seamen could be credible in 
number). What is particularly notable from these accounts is that these seamen did not only 
collect and provide reliable information, some – like Sturmy or the group of seamen Sloane 
encountered - also offered valuable interpretations of such phenomena. We acquire an even 
firmer sense of the seaman’s interpretive faculty if we turn to the case of the Royal Mathematical 
School,  which was established at Christ’s Hospital by Charles II in 1673 to prepare young boys 
for sea. In the 1690s, Pepys solicited the opinion of a number of prominent mathematicians and 
astronomers on the school’s curriculum. Lamenting the current state of the common seaman’s 
knowledge, proposals from Flamsteed, Newton and Halley all sought to convert the ignorant 
seaman into the expert through a greater acquaintance with theory, going beyond the ‘Directions’ 
by elevating seamen as interpreters as well as observers of nature. The new proposals were ‘not 
designed to give them only so much learning as is barely thought necessary for a plain Saylor… 
but that it is intended to have them instructed fully in all the skill that is requisit in an 
Accomplished Navigator’. The apprentice seaman would be trained in trigonometry, algebra, 
and map projection, become ‘acquainted with the stars’ and well-versed in ‘mechanical powers’; 
they were not to be instructed in ‘blind practical things, but required to know ‘the true reason of 
what they do.’ 76 
The young apprentices had been selected from a ‘great multitude’, but were all drawn from 
poor backgrounds (Christ’s Hospital being one of the largest charity schools in London). The 
boys’ potential as both skillful mariners and learned observers was therefore aligned with their 
education, not status, and the skills cultivated as a result of this. The dual function of their 
education was clear, for enhanced training would not only lead to improved maritime practice, 
but create a larger community of expert mariners who could more readily provide accurate 
observations and synthesise these for the use of experimental philosophy. Flamsteed, for 
instance, wrote that: 
 
If proper methods be taken in teaching [seamen]…they would contrive instruments much 
more convenient for taking the heights of the sun or stars aboard a ship…they would bring 
you home the latitudes of the ports in which they harbour’d… they would be able to make 
observations of the moon or satellite eclipses in any port...[to compare] with those made 
at the Greenwich observatory. 
 
Seamen were to work alongside experimental philosophers, comparing lunar observations to 
‘give us the true longitude of those ports’ that would allow for the correction of ‘the faults of our 
present maps and sea charts.’77 Halley had previously censured seamen for failing to make 
sufficient observations of coasts, ports, and points of longitude as they had opportunity to. ‘Tis 
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their own fault,’ he wrote ‘that they do not collate their several experiments, and bring them into 
a general synopsis which would be much for their own and the public service.’ The problem was 
not that they had failed to collect observations, but that they had failed to do anything with them. 
From this perspective, the seamen’s desired role extended beyond a collector of information, to 
an analyst of the information he gathered. Halley wanted seamen to bring their observations, 
experiments and experience into a general synthesis, to establish patterns or even laws of nature. 
On the matter of tides, for instance, he recommended that seamen should ‘compare and bring 
together their experience of the course of the tides, so as reduce them under some general rules.’78 
In this new scheme of learning, the seaman was expected to understand the causes of things, the 
theories that underwrote their practice, and to essentially behave in the way of the philosopher. 
In many ways, seamen embodied the authority of experience in early modern science, 
fashioned as Columbian-inspired informants and interpreters who were ‘eye witnesses and 
ministers of the things they speak of.’ Not only did their authority derive from the novelty and 
remoteness of the things they witnessed, but from the cumulative effect of these and a myriad of 
other experiences. Frequent practice, observation and exposure could generate a form of 
expertness that rendered them credible and authoritative in an alternative hierarchy of observers 
and thinkers. The gentlemanly trust model does not accommodate nor acknowledge the ways 
the seamen’s direct and accumulated experience were recognized, and indeed valued, in inquiry 
and discourse. The Royal Society sought to collect, publish and disseminate the journals of 
numerous seamen like Dampier and Knox and set out to recruit a whole network of expert 
navigators to amass information from across the globe. Experimental philosophers and 
naturalists like Boyle and Sloane solicited, weighted, and printed the judgement of seamen 
alongside their own and, within the same socio-intellectual circles, Flamsteed, Newton and Halley 
championed a vision of the expert seaman who, through greater theoretical training, could be 
molded in the image of the experimental philosopher. Symbolic of the overlapping worlds of 
science, seafaring, and government, William Petty, as Judge of the Court of Admiralty in Dublin, 
celebrated the knowledge of seamen; they brought ‘intelligence from all parts of the world’, they 
were concerned with the ‘motion of the heavenly bodies’ and they saw the ‘wonders of God in 
the deep.’ Although many in their current state of knowledge remained ill-equipped, as Petty 
would come to find, at least in theory, they ‘ought to be the best and most practical 
philosophers.’79  
Historians should now begin to consider whether the experience of all manual workers was 
treated in the same way. The authority of one group cannot be seen to reflect on another and we 
should consequently pay greater attention to the make-up of expertness in different professional 
groups, rather than reducing their knowledge and skill to generic notions of techne and bodily 
knowledge. Whether concerned with production (poiesis) or action (praxis), each group, from 
miners to goldsmiths, husbandmen to clock-makers, cultivated their own specialized sets of skills, 
knowledge and experience that the experimental philosopher could utilize. Expertise thus stands 
as an important entry point into understanding trust, credibility and authority in early modern 
science. It brings us beyond a restrictive mono-model that locates trust in one socio-cultural 
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category and allows us to appreciate the multiple, and sometimes competing, claims to 
epistemological authority. 
 
 
 
